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State v. Henson: 
TIME BETWEEN 
A FIRST AND 
SECOND ARREST 
ARISING OUT OF 
THE SAME 
CRIMINAL ACT 
IS NOT INCLUDED 
IN SPEEDY TRIAL 
ANALYSIS IF 
CHARGES ARE 
DISMISSED IN 
GOOD FAITH. 
In State v. Henson, 335 
Md. 326, 643 A.2d 432 (1994), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that when criminal 
charges are dismissed in good 
faith by the State and later rein-
stated, the time period involved 
in the speedy trial analysis does 
not begin until the second pros-
ecution has commenced. How-
ever, if the dismissal was made 
in bad faith, the date of the 
arrest or formal charge in the 
initial prosecution should be the 
starting point for the speedy 
trial analysis. 
RespondentErik Henson 
("Henson") was indicted on 
May 8, 1990, for assault with 
intent to murder and related 
charges arising from a shooting 
on May 11, 1989. He was ar-
rested on February 22, 1992, 
and subsequently filed a motion 
in the Circuit Court of Prince 
George's County to dismiss for 
lack of a speedy trial. At the 
hearing on the motion, it was 
brought to the court's attention 
that the Respondent had been 
previously arrested on May 25, 
1989, and prosecuted for the 
same charges. This initial pros-
ecution was terminated on July 
26, 1989, when the State dis-
missed, by nolle pros, the charg-
es pending against Henson. 
The motions court de-
nied the Respondent's motion 
and held that the time between 
the Respondent's arrest on the 
initial charges and the Respon-
dent's subsequent reindictment 
following the dismissal of the 
charges was excluded from the 
speedy trial analysis. In an un-
reported opinion, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland 
disagreed with the motions court 
and held that the Respondent's 
speedy trial time frame began to 
run from the date of the initial 
arrest. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland granted certiorari to 
determine whether the period 
between the Respondent's ar-
rest on the initial charges and his 
subsequent indictment is includ-
ed in the speedy trial analysis if 
the State dismissed the charges 
in good faith. The court of 
appeals held that the time peri-
od is not included in the analy-
sis. Therefore, the court of 
appeals vacated the court of 
special appeals' decision and 
remanded the case with instruc-
tions to vacate the judgment 
and remand the case to the cir-
cuit court to determine whether 
the State had dismissed the ini-
tial prosecution in good faith. 
The court of appeals 
began its analysis by defining 
the constitutional standard ap-
plicable in speedy trial cases. 
The court determined that the 
factors to be weighed in decid-
ing if a pre-trial delay is prejudi-
cial are: the length of the delay, 
the reason for the delay, the 
defendant's assertion of his or 
her right, and the prejudice to 
the defendant. Henson, 335 
Md. 326, 332, 643 A.2d 432, 
436 (1994) (citing Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972». 
The length of pre-trial delay 
determines whether the delay is 
prejudicial and therefore, the 
first factor becomes the thresh-
old issue. Since the present 
delay was less than the 180 day 
constitutional limit, the court 
concluded that the Respondent 
had not been prejudiced in any 
way, and the application of the 
remaining factors was unneces-
sary. 
While the time from the 
initial arrest or formal charge 
and the trial is the relevant peri-
od for speedy trial analysis, this 
period may be different if the 
prosecution is dismissed and 
later reinstated. Id at 333,643 
A.2d at 436. The court applied 
United States v. MacDonald, 
456 U.S. 1 (1982), which con-
cluded that the Speedy Trial 
Clause does not apply to the 
time frame between the State's 
good faith dismissal of the charg-
es and the reinstatement of the 
charges. Henson, 335 Md. at 
333,643 A.2dat436. Byimpli-
cation, ifthe State dismissed the 
charges in bad faith, the period 
between dismissal and reindictment 
was included in the computa-
tion so that the speedy trial anal-
ysis dates back to the initial 
arrest or filing of charges. 
Good faith, as defined 
by the court, is the lack of inten-
tion to "circumvent the speedy 
trial right." Id at 338, 643 
A.2d at 438. A distinction be-
tween a good and bad faith dis-
missal is needed to prevent the 
State from dismissing the charg-
es soley to avoid a violation of 
the Respondent' s Sixth Amend-
ment right to a speedy trial. 
When the State has acted in 
good faith in dismissing the 
charges, the court reasoned that 
the period between the good 
faith dismissal of the prosecu-
tion and the reinstatement ofthe 
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prosecution should not be con-
sidered in the speedy trial anal-
ysis. Id at 336, 643 A.2d at 
437. 
Whether the time be-
tween the initial arrest and the 
dismissal in the district court 
must be considered in the com-
putation ofthe speedy trial time 
frame was the next consider-
ation of the court. Id at 337, 
643 A.2d at 438. The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees that the 
State will proceed with diligence 
to assure that the charges will be 
disposed of in a timely manner. 
Id at 337,643 A.2d at 438. As 
a result, this ensures the protec-
tion ofa person's specific inter-
ests in decreasing the incarcera-
tion period before trial, reduc-
ing the impairment of liberty if 
released on bail, and minimizing 
the disruption oflife caused by 
arrest and criminal charges. Id. 
at 337, 643 A.2d at 438. Since 
the Respondent's interests are 
the same before and after the 
dismissal of the initial charges, 
his interests are not afforded 
any additional protection just 
because they existed before the 
dismissal. Id at 338, 643 A.2d 
at 438. As long as the dismissal 
of the initial charges is in good 
faith, the intervening time be-
tween the initial arrest and dis-
missal of the charges is not 
counted in computing whether 
the speedy trial requirement has 
been met. 
To decide which time 
frame should be applied in ana-
lyzing whether there has been a 
speedy trial, a determination of 
good faith is necessary. Since 
the issue of whether the dis-
missal of the initial charges was 
made in good faith was not de-
termined by the lower court, the 
court of appeals remanded the 
case through the court of spe-
cial appeals to the circuit court 
with instructions to decide that 
Issue. 
The court of appeals' 
decision in Henson ensures that 
the State will not dismiss charg-
es and later reinstate them with 
the sole purpose of avoiding a 
speedy trial violation. Prior to 
this decision, the state could 
have dismissed charges in bad 
faith when the 180 day limit was 
approaching and been able to 
reinstate the charges at a later 
time without violating the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment 
rights. The defendant's right to 
a speedy trial has been strength-
ened by Henson and is less likely 
to be threatened by a subse-
quent prosecution arising out of 
the same act as the initial pros-
ecution. 
- Nicole L. Baines 
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